Contents
Introduction 1
Sartre 1
Sartre's Self 1
Sartre's Other 2
Sartre's intersubjectivity 2
Why Sartre is silly 2
Laing 2
Laing's Self and Other 2
Construction 2
Maintenance 2
Aspects of self 2
Comparing Sartre and Laing 2
Philosophical Differences 2
Philosophical agreement 2
Psychological agreement 2
Bibliography 2Introduction
Sartre
Sartre's Self
Hmm to understand Sartre's self we need a little bit of his ontology. Ok, so there is consciousness. This consciousness is of a situation that we find ourselves, sitting in a café. Consciousness is fully absorbed in the positionality of this scene, the relation of waiter, to table, to plate, to fork. There is nothing to consciousness apart from immanence of the being of this situation and it does at the same time have a non-positional consciousness of this engagement. Any posited Ego in this situation, that it is I who is conscious, is a reflection back on the consciousness. Thus there are two aspects of consciousness in the café. Firstly there is the pre-reflective consciousness: There is consciousness of the café situation, then derivatively of this consciousness there is the fact that it is my consciousness of the café situation.Within the café scene then is a combination of facticity and transcendence. The objects that there is consciousness of are facts, in-itself structures, whose being is fully given in their appearance, who essence precedes their existence. This facticity is also wider than the mere objects in the café situation but also includes the language, culture, and personal past of this situation. All these aspects are fully given in consciousness.
There also exists a transcendence a for itself. Consciousness transcends itself to reach an object, its intention. This spontaneous transcendence of the pre-reflective consciousness also accounts for the negation that is part of consciousness's transcendence. In any situation there is activity of consciousness in so far as it negates the in-itself on the way to its original project.
Thus as I sit at the café with my desires, thus I transform the situation in which I sit, I may catch the eyes of one of the other clients, I may move the cup to my mouth and drink its contents or break the silence by humming a gentle tune. In short consciousness is activity\desire\negation and seeks to negate any situation in light of this.
The original project that motivates desire, is the sense that consciousness\the for-itself wants to realise its existence its being, its self-identity through its actions. Or in more poetic terms, the nothingness that I am seeks to be something, which whilst it can't fully realise is motivated towards.
Sartre's Other
As I sit in the café I am aware of sitting there, I reflect on my experience. At the same time as I take ownership of the pre-reflective consciousness there arises the you, the experience of the other, who partakes in this definition of I. As I reflect on this experience as mine, then I use language, the language that I was given, the language wherein the other exists. As soon as I reflect on my experience I objectify it, turn it to an in itself, who existence is solidified by the other. It is only through the other that I can make rules as I would never know if I had broken a rule without the other, thus my original project to make something out of nothing is co-extensive with the other.As I reflect on an experience as mine, I reflect in the eyes of the other, who is there in this reflection however they exist as transcendental subject, as nihilating consciousness.
Thus my freedom which is manifest through my original project is at the same time curtailed by the facticity of the freedom of the other, which will negate me and my project.
As I sit there gently humming, the waiter comes close to me and gives me a dirty look which I think is due to my humming. I feel shame and guilt reduced to the object that shouldn't hum. Feeling this, I realise that I am the customer and he is the mere waiter and I look at him as such, reducing him to my servant and he shuffles away.
As I receive the look from the other then I am aware of objectifying gaze of the subject of the other. I encounter his freedom in so far as this is manifest by curtailing mine.
The meeting of the other, my being with others, is a bodily event. It is as I'm embodied as being in the world with the aforementioned facticity of language and culture that I meet the other. Thus the feelings of the gaze are essentially a bodily aspect, the shame of embarrassment is the shame of the body, the redness of my embarrassed cheeks.
Sartre's intersubjectivity
The for-itselfs nature is to nihilate in terms of the original project, thus as I encounter the other so I must nihilate them to achieve my project, I must treat them as object to satisfy my freedom as subject, thus the relations between people are sadistic where I objectify the other, or masochistic where I allow the other to objectify me.The notion of love between people is an impossibility if love is to be the merging of two consciousnesses. The other in their freedom reduces me to object, yet in love wants to merge with me in my freedom, for my freedom to merge with theirs must reduce them to an in-itself, capable of being a determinate entity to merge with. Alternatively I can submit to their pure objectification, take the free choice to be their object, but then I still don't engage with them in their freedom, I am merely the outcome of their freedom, likewise the same failure of meeting exists within its contrary masochism.
Why Sartre is silly
- He takes the in-itself as pre-existing, but how can I recognise the plate as a plate unless I am already aware of it, is not consciousness embodied? In other words how can I assume a correspondence between consciousness of the in itself and the in itself. The for-itself and in-itself are unwarranted abstractions from experience for more details see being-in-the-world
- Nothingness which underpins the for-itself, is not a negation of being, of the in-itself. To be what I am not, is to replace what I am with another plenitude
- The in-itself is not an independent structure, but only exists in so far as it is a project of the for-itself, thus the table is made by man to put cups on etc, thus the in-itself is dependent on its being for the for-itself and has no fixed being
- The gaze does not reduce me to an in-itself like a table, but rather a factical restriction of the for itself. The gaze is actually me taking the eyes of the other, as I have no idea what they actually think, thus it is me restricting my for itself, through the eyes of the other. Maybe I am just an object of thought to the other, so they look at me as this sort of person at this sort of time but don't restrict me to thinking that's all I can be. Indeed doesn't the feeling of shame talk more about you doing something that you are not proud of, so the for itself choosing something it shouldn't, isn't the other merely a short cut to our view of freedom of our self, our looking at one of our choices and being appalled by it, thus it almost more speaks of a surprise and a disgust that our for itself could take us this way
- If the other is encountered through his objectifying gaze, as to have something in consciousness is to objectify it, then how can I be aware of myself as for itself, as to be conscious I must objectify but that would turn the for-itself into an in-itself
Laing
Laing's Self and Other
For Laing there is no metaphysically real self only "One's self-identity is the story one tells one's self of who one is" [Laing 1990 P93]. This self is deeply fabricated on assumptions of inner and outer, mind and body and the scope of our efficacy, i.e. when we act what our domain of effects are. This self is constructed by our interaction with others. Indeed our primary carers make the first and most significant effect in this area "We learn to be whom we are told we are" [Laing 1990 P95]. Thus the non-being of the self is not far away: "Man is always between being and non-being [..]this term is used to denote the insecurity inescapably within the heart of man's finite being" [Laing 1990 P51].Thus for Laing self-identity is a dynamic insubstantial aspect that we must preserve for fear of descending into the madness of non-being.
Self-identity is both constructed by interaction with the other and also maintained by this.
Construction
The necessary element of any aspect self-identity always involves the other. "Emptiness and futility can arise when a person has put himself into his acts [..] if he is accorded no recognition by the other" [Laing 1990 P83]. Self-identity provides meaning and value to an individual, however meaning and value can only be attained if there is acknowledgement of this meaning and value by the other. This is almost of necessity as if the other gave the notion of self-identity in the first place, it is the other that controls value and meaning.Likewise there is also a sense of defining oneself in terms of role, your mothers son, your friend's friend, the company employ and the like. Here in interaction with the other or with the group the self-identity is defined. The other here may be a person, the mother, or a group such as the company. If the latter then there is a nexus, the element that connects the group together and it will be this that defines the sense of self identity that is received.
Maintenance
As the self needs to be dynamically constructed by behaviour and intention, ie if I consider myself to be a generous person then this is dynamically constructed by being generous, then the other is needed to validate this position. When I meet the other, then I get confirmation that I exist, I also get confirmation that I exist as a certain person. This type of argument is underpinned by the Wittengenstinian notion that you cannot follow a rule without another person as you would never know that you broke the rule unless another told you. Another way of looking at this is meaning is a shared entity, what clever/generous etc is, is a definition made by a group, therefore something that is confirmed by the other.Aspects of self
There are different aspects of self.- What I think I am
- What I would like to be
- What the other(s) want me to be
- What I need the other to be to maintain my self-identity (If I think I am generous I need another person to receive from me)
Comparing Sartre and Laing
Sartre and Laing come from different discourses, Sartre a philosopher who produces psychological outcomes, Laing a psychologist who uses philosophical ideas, so direct contrast is difficult.Philosophical Differences
Sartre is a dualist with the self being a separate entity to the other. Laing is a co-creationist with self and the other mutually constructing each other.Sartre sees the self as defining the self by negating the in-itself and the other, Laing sees the other as constituting the self, thus Laing sees the other as more significant in the construction of the self than does Sartre who considers the negation of the in-itself to be as significant.
Philosophical agreement
They both agree that the self is nothing and needs to be continually constructed.Psychological agreement
Their main agreement is in the non-existence of the unconscious as a an entity in the Freudian sense that is a certain type of substance. Sartre dismisses this as he sees the logical flaw in the notion of repression which would have to be conscious of that which it makes unconscious and therefore it would be conscious of the unconscious material.Laing sees that unconscious is a term that is used to get out of the difficulties of defining reality against the polarities of inner\outer, mind\body, self\others and the like and sees the unconscious as what we do not communicate to ourselves or others.
Bibliography
RD Laing Self and Others Penguin 1990The world of existentialism Friedman Humanity 1999
Four phenomenological philosophers Christopher Macann Routledge 1993
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